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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on privatization by examining the performance 
of newly privatized firms in South-European countries, more precisely by analyzing 
operational performance changes between the pre and post-privatization period.  
To measure operational performance change, accounting measures for profitability, 
efficiency, investment, output, employment, leverage and dividend policy are analyzed 
between 3 years before and 3 years after the privatization. In addition to the raw 
analysis, market-adjusted analysis is performed, both for full sample and for two 
subsamples: i) firms in competitive versus non-competitive markets and ii) 
privatizations in which the government sells enough shares to bring its holdings below 
50 percent (control privatizations) versus privatizations in which the government retains 
a majority stake (revenue privatizations). Finally, to more effectively isolate the effect 
of the privatization, a multivariate analysis is also reported. 
For the full sample, unadjusted data show an increase in profitability, efficiency, output 
and dividends and a decrease in investment. Despite the positive change in employment 
and the negative change in leverage, these changes are insignificant. The market-
adjusted analysis reveals less significant results. Changes in performance for all 
measures but dividends (where a significant increase is reported) are insignificant. The 
multivariate analysis corroborates the results obtained in the maket-adjusted univariate 
analysis.  
Key-Words: State-owned; Privatization; Performance  
JEL Code: L33, L32  
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I. Introduction 
In the last three decades, several countries have launched ambitious privatization 
programs.  
Although Britain’s Thatcher government may not have been the first to launch a large 
privatization program, it is without question the most important one historically 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). After this ambitious plan launched in the early 80s, 
several countries worldwide introduced privatization as a tool to achieve political and 
economic goals and, since then, governments have raised around 2.5 trillion dollars 
through privatizations (Megginson, 2011)  
Figure I describes the evolution of total privatization revenues (in billion dollars) 
worldwide and in the enlarged European Union since 1988. It clearly illustrates that the 
sale revenues peaked in the late 90s, dropped sharply during the recession of 2001-
2003, and then fluctuated between 94 billion and 140 billion dollars during 2004 and 
2008. Both 2009 and 2010 were record years in privatization revenues but, due to the 
financial gloom pervading most of 2011, this year witnessed the lowest total value of 
revenues (94.4 billion dollars) from privatizations worldwide since 2004.  
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Figure I: Privatization Revenues 
This figure presents the total revenue (in billion dollars) from privatization transactions occurring 
between 1988 and 2011. Data is aggregated by countries from European Union (EU25) and the rest 
of the World (World, excluding EU25). Source: Megginson (2011) 
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As seen in Figure I, the trend in the enlarged European Union is similar to what 
happened round the world.  Those 25 countries have raised more than 1 trillion dollars 
since 1988, which represents 43% of the total world privatization revenue. However, 
since 2008, a major decline occurred in the privatization revenues from the European 
Union, hitting the minimum in 2011 with just 26 billion dollars, and those countries 
accounted for a small minority of the total value of privatization deals worldwide. 
 
Despite this reduction, the next few years are expected to witness a growth in 
privatization deals, especially in South-European countries. The debt crisis which arose 
in the last years has forced some governments to launch ambitious privatization 
programs in order to raise revenues. Specifically Greece
1
, Portugal
2
, Spain
3
 and even 
Italy
4
 are already implementing privatization plans for the period 2011-2013 that 
amount to 15 billion euros, 5.5 billion euros, 30 billion euros and 10 billion euros, 
respectively.  
This paper contributes to the literature on privatization by examining the performance 
of newly privatized firms in South-European countries, more precisely by analyzing 
operating performance changes between the pre- and post-privatization period. The 
sample includes 45 companies, from 4 countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy), 
that experienced full or partial privatization from 1997 to 2012. Accounting measures 
for profitability, efficiency, investment, output, employment, leverage and dividends are 
analyzed between 3 years before and 3 years after privatization. To more closely 
examine the sources of any privatization-induced performance changes, in addition to 
the full sample analysis, two pairs of subsamples are examined: i) firms in competitive 
                                                             
1 Greek privatization program includes transactions regarding a number of key sectors such as: Banking, 
Energy (Public Power Corporation, DEPA and DESFA), Gaming (OPAP, Casinos and State Lottery 
Tickets), Telecoms (OTE), Ports, Airports (Athens International Airport, Regional Airports), Motorways, 
Railways, Mining (LARCO), Water and Waste Management, Defence Industries and Real Estate.  
2 Portuguese privatization plan includes the privatization of companies from the transportation sector 
(Airports of Portugal, TAP, and CP Cargo), energy sector (GALP, EDP and REN), communications 
sector (Correios de Portugal and RTP), insurance (Caixa Seguros) and services (Águas de Portugal).   
3  The Spanish privatization plan affects state companies such as Renfe, Aena, Puertos del Estado y 
Paradores, and will include the divestment on IAG, Ebro Foods and Red Eléctrica de España (REE). 
4  The Italian plan includes the privatization of Fintecna, Sace and Simest. The government still is 
studying the opportunity to privatize other companies.  
3 
 
versus non-competitive markets and ii) control versus revenue privatizations. Moreover, 
to isolate the effect of privatization from the impact of macroeconomic and sector 
changes, both raw and market-adjusted measures are analyzed. Finally, to more 
effectively isolate the effect of the privatization from others sources of performance 
changes, a multivariate analysis is also reported. 
For the full sample, unadjusted data show an increase in profitability, efficiency, output 
and dividends and a decrease in investment. Although the positive change in 
employment and the negative change in leverage, these changes are insignificant. The 
market-adjusted analysis reveals less significant results. Changes in performance for all 
measures but dividends (where a significant increase is reported) are insignificant. The 
multivariate analysis corroborates the results obtained in the maket-adjusted univariate 
analysis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary of 
the recent theoretical and empirical research on privatization. Section III describes the 
data and the sample selection. Section IV presents the methodology and testable 
predictions. In Section V and VI, are presented and discussed the empirical results from 
the univariate and multivariate analysis, respectively. Finally, Section VI summarizes 
the results. 
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II. Literature Review 
This section is divided into two main subjects. Firstly, it includes a presentation of the 
main theories on the effect of privatization on firms’ performance. Afterwards, it 
focuses on the analysis of the empirical results reported in the most influent studies on 
this subject. 
1. Theoretical Framework 
The assumption behind privatization in many parts of the world is that private 
ownership improves corporate performance (Frydman et al., 1999). However, this is 
still a matter of debate for which theorists found no consensus.  
Supporters of privatization argue that under competitive markets, the private sector can 
provide the same services more efficiently than the public sector, both in terms of 
technical and allocative efficiency (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Shleifer, 1998). This 
superior performance of privately owned companies can be explained by the different 
conditions these companies face in comparison with state-owned companies and can be 
briefly classified into four categories: 
 a) Harder budget constraints: the ‘property rights’ theorists argue that managers in 
public firms do not suffer the economic consequences of their decisions, which reduces 
the incentives to maximize performance. A major source of inefficiency in public firms 
stems from less-prosperous firms being allowed to rely on the government for funding, 
leading to soft budget constraints (Shleifer, 1998). Therefore, the discipline enforced on 
private firms by the capital markets and by the threat of financial distress is dramatically 
reduced for state-owned firms as they benefit of almost unlimited funding from 
government, minimizing the company connection with capital markets and lessening the 
bankruptcy risk to almost zero. Ultimately, these soft budget constrains faced by state-
owned enterprises withdraw the pressure of good results from the manager, contributing 
to a worse performance. 
b) More competitive and more efficient markets for corporate and managerial control: 
in line with the previous category, the ‘property rights’ theorists argue that managers in 
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public firms have weaker incentives to maximize performance as they do not face the 
threat of takeover.  (Boycko et al., 1996; Vining and Boardman, 1992); 
c) Clearer corporate and managerial goals: the political view of the Agency theory 
argues that governments pursue objectives in addition to and in conflict with profit 
maximization, and that this political interference can distort the objectives and 
constraints faced by managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). 
Commonly, government-owned firms forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and 
political objectives, such as wealth redistribution. However, this kind of goal is difficult 
to measure and to use as guiding policy for corporate operations (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001). 
 d) More intense monitoring: the managerial view of the Agency theory postulates the 
separation of ownership and control as the main source of relatively poorer performance 
of public firms as conflicts of interests will arise. Additionally, it argues that state-
owned firms have difficulty on monitoring managers (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). As 
stated above, the unclearness and incompatibility of the objectives of state-owned firms 
leads to greater difficulty in measuring the accomplishment of those goals and, 
consequently, in linking the manager’s performance to their accomplishment. 
Moreover, even if the government and the nation's citizens agree that profit 
maximization is the goal of the firm (leaving behind the incompatibility of profit and 
social welfare maximization), Shleifer (1998) argues that the owners of public firms 
(the nation’s citizens) are less able to write complete contracts that adequately tie 
managers' incentives to that goal.  
However, as mentioned above, the view that government firms are inherently less 
efficient than private ones remains controversial among economists.  
Vickers and Yarrow (1991), among others, point out that agency problems arise in 
private firms as well as in public ones. It happens because, in most large private 
corporations, managers own little of the stock. Therefore, a divergence between their 
objectives and those of private shareholders arises. As each private shareholder 
typically holds a small stake in the firm and as monitoring is costly, it may not pay any 
shareholder to bear the cost of monitoring management.  
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Other arguments against privatization have centered on the possibility that the higher 
performance of privatized companies has come at the expense of social welfare, namely 
by the exploitation of market power (and resulting higher prices) or by the reduction of 
employment and wages (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Likewise, several authors stated 
that the performance improvements in privatized state-owned firms are not due to the 
change in ownership but due to the competitive environment and capital-market 
discipline that greatly improve monitoring possibilities and hence increase incentives 
for production efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). 
Furthermore, a debate about the role of privatization and the role of market competition 
has arisen. Arguments for state-ownership rely on the need to regulate or own 
monopolies, intervene in case of externalities, and help provide public goods. Thus, 
Welfare theory would argue that privatization tends to have the greatest positive impact 
for state-owned firms in competitive markets or markets that can become readily 
competitive (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Nevertheless, Shleifer (1998) and others 
have argued that, for many of the reasons discussed above, even in markets for public 
goods and natural monopolies, state-owned firms are rarely the appropriate solution. 
As mentioned above, this is still a matter of debate. As stated by Megginson and Netter 
(2001), arguments for state-ownership rest on some market failure or perceived market 
failure. Arguments for privatization, in turn, are a response to the failings of state-
ownership. 
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2. Empirical Evidence 
There are several empirical studies evaluating the impact of state-ownership on firms’ 
performance. In this regard, besides the methodology of case-study analysis, there are 
two possible approaches: i) cross-sectional analysis, which compares the performance 
of state-owned companies and privately owned companies, or ii) time-series analysis, 
which examines the performance of a company before and after the privatization 
process.  
Due to the serious methodological difficulties faced by the first mentioned approach
1
, as 
for instance the determination of the appropriate set of comparison firms or 
benchmarks, the research done in this paper follows the second approach. Therefore, the 
literature review is focused on studies that analyzed pre- versus post-privatization 
performance of privatized companies
2
. Nevertheless, a summary of recent papers 
comparing the performance of state-owned and privately owned companies is available 
at Megginson and Netter (2001) and the reported results suggest a consensus in this 
matter: all studies but one found evidence of better performance on privately owned 
companies
3
.   
Since the first study published examining the effect of privatization on firm 
performance comparing pre- versus post-privatization performance, Megginson et al. 
(1994), a large number of studies using the same methodology emerged
4
. 
Megginson et al. (1994) use a methodology that consists of the comparison of three-
year average post-privatization operating performance ratios to the three-year pre-
privatization values of firms in different countries and industries. Those authors tested 
for the significance of median changes in ratio values in the post- versus pre-
privatization periods and also employed binomial tests for the percentage of firms 
                                                             
1 Detailed information about the methodological difficulties is available at Megginson and Netter (2001) 
2 A summary of the methodology and main results of the papers discussed in this literature review is 
available in the Appendix I. 
3 Despite this relative recent consensus, as surveyed in Boardman and Vining (1989), different studies 
realized before the 1990s found evidence of either superior performance of state-owned firms or privately 
owned firms, or no significant difference between performances.  
4 A summary of the statistical results obtained in the three most cited papers on this subject is available in 
the Appendix II. 
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whose ratio changed according to their predictions. Their predictions are generally in 
accordance with the study of several authors and are as follow: 
-Profitability: as firms move from public to private ownership, their profitability 
should increase. In contrast to government-ownership, private shareholders wish the 
firm to maximize profit. So, newly privatized firms' managers should place greater 
emphasis on profit goals (Yarrow et al., 1986).  
-Operating efficiency: following privatization, firms should employ their human, 
financial and technological resources more efficiently because of a greater stress on 
profit goals and a reduction of government subsidies (Boycko et al., 1996; Kikeri et al., 
1994).  
-Capital investment: the greater emphasis on efficiency, the access to private debt and 
equity markets and the higher incentives to invest in growth opportunities will lead 
newly privatized firms to increase their capital investment spending (Megginson et al., 
1994). 
-Output: according to Megginson et al. (1994), following privatization, output should 
increase because of greater competition, better incentives and more flexible financing 
opportunities. However, the theoretical model of Boycko et al. (1996) predicts a fall in 
output since the government no longer subsidizes the newly privatized firms to maintain 
inefficiently high output levels. 
-Employment: there is no consensus with regard to the impact of privatization on the 
level of employment. On the one hand, privatization might lead to an increase in the 
level of employment, since privatized firms probably would target growth and expand 
their investment spending. On the other hand, it is confirmed that most state-owned 
firms tend to be overstaffed for many social reasons. So, in order to increase efficiency, 
extensive layoffs would be expected following privatization (Kikeri et al., 1994).  
-Leverage: according to Megginson et al. (1994), the switch from public to private 
ownership should lead to a decrease in the proportion of debt in the capital structure. 
This is expected due to the higher cost of borrowing that the company will face once the 
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government debt guarantees are withdrawn and due to their access to public equity 
markets. 
-Dividends: following privatization, dividend payments should increase because, unlike 
governments, private investors generally demand dividends. Furthermore, dividend 
payments are a classic response to the atomized ownership structure which most 
privatization programs lead to (Megginson et al., 1994). 
 
Following that methodology, analyzing the performance of 61 companies from 18 
countries and 32 industries that were divested during 1961–1989, Megginson et al. 
(1994) documented statistically significant post-privatization increases in output, 
operating efficiency, profitability, capital investment spending and dividend payments, 
as well as significant decreases in leverage. Contrary to their predictions, Megginson et 
al. (1994) found that the median level of employment increases significantly (at the 10 
percent significance level).  
Megginson et al. (1994) also found that their basic results remain unchanged when they 
compared firms operating in competitive versus non-competitive industries, when they 
examined full versus partial privatizations, and when they compared industrialized and 
developing country privatizations. However, when Megginson et al. (1994) partitioned 
their data based on the fraction of a firm’s board that is replaced, they documented 
significantly greater performance improvements for the group of firms that experience 
50 percent or greater turnover than for the group of companies experiencing less 
dramatic change in directors after divestment. 
Using the same approach, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) analyzed the privatization 
experience of 79 companies from 21 developing countries divested between 1980 and 
1992 and documented the same results: increases in output, operating efficiency, 
profitability, capital investment spending, employment and dividend payments, as well 
as significant decreases in leverage. Boubakri and Cosset (1998) also used market-
adjusted measures to isolate macroeconomic and industry-level changes. The obtained 
results were similar, although the decrease in leverage becomes insignificant.  Similar 
results were reported by Boubakri et al. (2005), when analyzing profitability, efficiency, 
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output and investment measures from privatized companies in 32 developed countries 
between 1980 and 1999. 
The same results were reported in D'Souza et al. (2005), studying 129 companies from 
23 developed countries privatized from 1961 to 1999, and in D'Souza and Megginson 
(1999) that studies 85 companies from 28 countries privatized during the period 1990–
1996. The only
5
 exception occurs for employment measures in which both studies 
documented an insignificant decrease.  
In other study that analyzes 16 African firms divested through public share offering 
between 1989 and 1996, Boubakri and Cosset (1999) documented significant increased 
capital spending by privatized firms, but found only insignificant changes in 
profitability, efficiency, output and leverage. 
In addition to the Megginson et al. (1994)’s methodology, Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001) performed a multivariate regression analysis in order to control for changes 
occurring before privatization and for business cycle. Their results also documented 
signiﬁcant increases in proﬁtability and signiﬁcant decreases in leverage over both 
short-term (3 years) and long-term (5 years) horizons. Contrary to Megginson et al. 
(1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998), labour intensity decreased significantly. 
Another important finding of this study is the increase of profits prior to divestiture, 
supporting the idea that privatization can have a significant anticipation effect. 
This literature review focused on the most relevant international studies comparing pre- 
versus post-privatization performance demonstrates some consensus on the effect of 
privatization on profitability, output, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, 
dividend payments, and leverage. Except leverage, which decreases after privatization, 
all other parameters show an increase following state divestment. However, the effect 
on employment is not clear.   
                                                             
5 Note that there is an additional minor difference in D'Souza and Megginson (1999). Though absolute 
capital expenditures increase significantly, relative capital expenditures increase insignificantly. 
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III. Data and Sample 
This section explains how the sample and the data were collected and presents its main 
descriptive statistics. 
1. Sample selection 
In order to try to understand the effect that privatization may have on countries of 
southern Europe, which will suffer a new wave of privatization in the coming years, it 
seems pertinent to study what effect privatization in the same countries has had in the 
operating performance of companies privatized in the last years.  
For this purpose a sample of companies from Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain 
privatized between 1985 and 2012 was selected. The sample of privatized firms was 
drawn from the Privatization Barometer Database, the official provider of privatization 
data to OECD and the World Bank. The analysis is limited to non-financial companies 
that privatized 5 percent or more of their equity. To avoid overlapping effects in 
companies where there were multiple privatization operations, only the first 
privatization operation of each company is considered. These selection criteria yield a 
sample of 256 companies. 
Subsequently, the financial data for those companies was obtained from Capital IQ 
Database. Only companies with at least one annual observation in the years -3 to -1 and 
in the period +1 to +3 (where the year of privatization is defined as year 0) are 
considered. Thereafter, the final sample includes 45 companies (9 from Portugal, 22 
from Italy, 5 from Greece and 9 from Spain). The list of companies included in this 
study is available in the Appendix III. 
Finally, Consumer Price Index (CPI) used to calculate real sales, sales efficiency and 
net income efficiency, was drawn from the World Bank Database. 
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2. Sample description 
Table I presents some characteristics of the privatization transactions and privatized 
firms included in the sample. 
As referred before, the sample includes 45 transactions, half of them occurring in Italy 
(22), 5 in Greece and 9 both in Portugal and Spain. On average, in each transaction, a 
36% stake on the firm was sold by the government. This value is significantly higher for 
transactions that took place in Portugal (43.8%), and significantly lower for Greek 
transactions (23.1%).  
 
The majority of the transactions included in the sample (35 out of 45) were public offers 
and almost half of the companies (25 out of 45) operated in competitive industries. 
Regarding the dimension of the transaction, Table I shows that on average (median), 
each transaction is worth 1 372 million dollars (372 million dollars). The average 
(median) transaction´s dimension is the largest in Italy (Portugal), being worth 2 135 
million dollars (481 million dollars). 
Portugal Italy Greece Spain FULL SAMPLE
Sample 9 22 5 9 45
%  Shares Sold 43.8 (32.5) 39.2 (38.7) 23.1 (25) 38.5 (30) 36.1 (33.5)
Sample of Privatizations 
Through Public Sale
5 20 4 6 35
Sample of Firms Operating 
in Competitve Industries
4 12 3 6 25
Value of Transaction         
(US $ million)
832.9 (480.5) 2 135.4 (378.3) 216.83 (210.9) 685.6 (387.4) 1 372.3 (327.2)
Total Assets                            
(€ million)
5 264.4 (4 127.8) 4 665.6 (1 212.6) 2 077.9 (999.9) 5 195.5 (1 502.8) 4 557.2 (1 502.8)
Return on Sales (% )     
9.64 (6.14) -128.55 (7.35) 11.72 (13.68) 2.61 (4.65) -59.09 (7.02)
Debt to Assets (% )                   
122.67 (30.77) 24.56 (18.47) 23.38 (16.04) 28.32 (26.99) 44.85 (23.30)
Table I: Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents some statistics related to the sample. It provides the number of transactions included in the sample, the 
mean (median) stake (in % of the company) sold by the government, the number of transactions that were publicly traded, the 
number of firms operating in Competitve Industries (firms opperating in all industries with the exception of 
telecommunications, water and electric utilities), the mean (median) value of the transaction (in million dollars), the mean 
(median) value of total assets of the firms (in million euros) in the three years before privatization, the mean (median) return on 
assets and debt to assets  in the three years before privatization. In addition to the full sample data, data by country is also 
provided. 
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Regarding the firm characteristics, in the three years before privatization, on average 
(median), the total assets were equal to 4 557 million euros (1 503 million euros). 
Considering the mean and median total assets values, the largest firms privatized were 
Portuguese and Spanish companies. Profitability, measured by the return on sales, was 
on average (median), -59.09% (7.02%). This negative value for the average return on 
sales is mainly explained by some large negative values observed in Italy (which 
accounts for almost half of the full sample). However, note that the median return on 
sales for Italy is positive and similar to the median in Portugal. Finally, debt-to-assets 
ratio is on average (median) equal to 44.85% (23.30%) for the full sample. Data shows 
a higher leverage in Portuguese firms and a lower leverage in Greek firms.  
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IV. Methodology and Testable Predictions 
In line with previous studies, the methodology used and testable predictions are similar 
to those in the reference work of Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D'Souza and Megginson 
(1999) and Megginson et al. (1994) 
To test for changes on firms’ performance, firstly empirical proxies are computed for 
every company for a seven-year period, from three years before to three years after 
privatization.  
Subsequently, the mean of each variable for each firm over the pre- and post-
privatization windows (pre-privatization years: -3 to -1, post-privatization years: +1 to 
+3) is calculated. However, it is important to note that the sample includes companies 
that had one observation or more in each window. Furthermore, since the year of 
privatization (year 0) includes both the public and private ownership phases for all 
firms, it is excluded from the analysis.  
To test for significant changes in the variables, two tests are used. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used to test whether the median difference in variable values between 
the pre- and post-privatization samples is zero. In addition to the Wilcoxon test, it is 
used a binomial Proportion Test to determine whether the proportion p of firms 
experiencing changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by chance, 
typically testing whether p =0.5.  
As summarized in Table II, following Megginson et al. (1994)’s predictions, it is tested 
whether a firm:  
a)  increases its profitability: to test for changes in profitability return on sales, return on 
assets and return on equity are used as proxies. 
b) increases its operating efficiency: real sales (ie, inflation-adjusted sales) per 
employee and net income per employee are used to test for operating efficiency 
changes. For both measures values are normalized to equal 1 in the privatization year 
(year 0) so other year figures are expressed as a fraction of the value observed in the 
year of divestment. 
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c) increases its capital investment spending: two ratios are analyzed to test for 
investment changes, capital expenditures-to-sales and capital expenditures-to-total 
assets. 
d)  increases its output: real sales (ie, inflation-adjusted sales) are used to test for output 
changes. To compare pre- and post-privatization performance, values are normalized to 
equal 1 in the privatization year (year 0) so other year figures are expressed as a fraction 
of the value observed in the year of divestment. 
e) decreases employment: total number of full time employees is used to test for 
employment changes.  Once again, values are normalized to equal 1 in the privatization 
year (year 0) so other year figures are expressed as a fraction of the value observed in 
the year of divestment. 
f)  decreases leverage: two proxies are used to test for leverage changes, total debt-to-
total assets and  long-term debt-to-equity. 
g) increases dividend payments: changes in the dividend policy are tested using two 
ratios, dividend-to-sales and dividend-to-net income. 
Characteristics Proxies Predicted Relationship
Return on Sales (ROS) = Net Income ÷ Sales ROSPOS > ROSPRE
Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Income ÷ Total Assets ROAPOS > ROAPRE
Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income ÷ Equity ROEPOS > ROEPRE
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) = Sales ÷ Number of employees SALEFFPOS > SALEFFPRE
Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) = Net Income ÷ Number of employees NIEFFPOS> NIEFFPRE
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA) = Capital Expenditures ÷ Sales CESAPOS> CESAPRE
Capital Expenditures to Assets (CETA) = Capital Expenditures ÷ Total Assets CETAPOS> CETAPRE
Output Real Sales (SAL) = Nominal Sales ÷ Consumer Price Index
SALPOS > SALPRE        
(CANNOT PREDICT)
Employment Total Employment (EMPL) = Total Number of Employees
EMPLPOS < EMPLPRE 
(CANNOT PREDICT)
Debt to Assets (LEV) = Total Debt ÷ Total Assets LEVPOS < LEVPRE
Long-Term Debt to Equity (LEV2) = Long-Term Debt ÷ Equity LEV2POS < LEV2PRE
Dividends to Sales (DIVSAL) = Cash Dividends ÷ Sales DIVSALPOS > DIVSALPRE
Dividend Payout (PAYOUT) = Cash Dividends ÷ Net Income PAYOUTPOS > PAYOUTPRE
Dividends
Table II: Summary of Testable Predictions
Profitability
Operating 
Efficiency
Capital 
Investment
Leverage
This table details the economic characteristics that will be examined in order to evaluate changes in firms performance. It also 
presents and defines the preferred and alternative empirical proxies that will be employed in the analyses. In all cases with 
two or more proxies listed, the one listed first is considered to be the preferred and most reliable empirical variable because it 
uses a current-euro measure in either the numerator or the denominator, or both. Furthermore, the predicted changes in the 
economic characteristics after privatization are detailed. The index words PRE and POS in the predicted relationship column 
stand for before and after privatization, respectively. 
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Following Boubakri and Cosset (1998), it is important to isolate the effect of 
privatization on the operating performance of state-owned firms from other 
determinants of this performance, like macro-economic or industry-level events. To 
take this possibility into account, in addition to the simple analysis mentioned above, 
market-adjusted accounting performance measures are used. Hence, the market-adjusted 
accounting performance measure of a firm is the difference between its accounting 
performance measure and its industry accounting performance measure. Note that the 
industry index for each company is estimated as the median ratio for all worldwide 
similar firms on the Capital IQ database. In this study, a company is considered to be 
similar to the one in analysis if it operates in the same industry and if its total assets or 
total revenues are contained in the interval corresponding to 125% and 75% of the total 
assets or total revenues of the original company, in the privatization year. The financial 
data for those companies was also obtained from Capital IQ Database. Due to the lack 
of financial data for similar companies, the market-adjusted analysis was computed only 
for 41 companies (5 from Portugal, 22 from Italy, 5 from Greece and 9 from Spain). 
 To more closely analyse the effect of privatization, in addition to the full sample 
analysis, data was divided into two subsamples according to the level of competition in 
the industry and according to the percentage of the company sold by the government. 
Finally, to more effectively isolate the effect of the privatization, a multivariate analysis 
is also reported. 
As argued in D'Souza et al. (2005), studies using accounting data are subject to 
numerous empirical hazards. However, in this study, some of these concerns are 
minimized. First, the fact that the sample is entirely from developed countries and 
mainly from publicly listed companies, it is expected a higher quality and a greater 
availability of accounting data. Second, sample selection bias is also reduced once, as 
stated by D'Souza et al. (2005), this concern is more relevant in earlier studies of 
privatization, which is not the case. Finally, contrary to many studies, a market-adjusted 
analysis is performed, controlling for business cycle and industry level changes, 
allowing comparisons between accounting information generated at different times in 
many different countries. 
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V. Univariate Analysis 
In the following sections the empirical results are presented and discussed, using 
unadjusted performance measures for the whole sample of 45 privatized firms and 
market-adjusted performance measures for the 41 privatized firms for which market-
adjusted ratios could be computed. Due to the lack of data, marked-adjusted measures 
for efficiency and employment could not be computed. 
1. Full Sample Analysis 
Profitability 
Profitability is measured using three ratios: return on sales (ROS), return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). According to  Boubakri and Cosset (1998), ROS is 
the most reliable ratio as it is based on two flow measures that are less sensitive to 
inflation and to accounting conventions. Therefore, the analysis is focused on the ROS 
ratio. 
As reported in Table III, despite the inconsistency of the unadjusted results regarding 
the change in profitability depending on the analyzed measure (mean or median), both 
test statistics show improvements in profitability after divestiture. This increase in 
profitability is in accordance with the predictions of Megginson et al. (1994). 
Nevertheless, those improvements are only significant (at 10 percent level) for the ROS 
ratio. 
The mean unadjusted return on sales goes from -5.9 percent before privatization to 8.5 
percent after privatization. Sixty percent of the sample firms experienced an increase in 
ROS and ROA and 56 percent experienced an increase in ROE. As in D'Souza and 
Megginson (1999), Megginson et al. (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998), results are 
stronger for the return on sales. Similar to this study, increases in ROE are insignificant 
in those three studies.  
Regarding the market-adjusted data, as occurred in Boubakri and Cosset (1998), the 
significance of results diminishes. Therefore, as it can be seen in Table IV, the increase 
in profitability is not significant anymore, contrary to what happened in Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998), where the increase in ROS was significant. 
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Variables N
Mean 
(Median) 
Before
Mean 
(Median) 
After
Mean 
(Median) 
Change
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted (%)
Profitability
Return on Sales (ROS) 45 -0.591 0.085 0.676 1.64 * 0.60 1.34
(0.07) (0.064) (-0.007)
Return on Assets (ROA) 45 0.041 0.039 -0.001 1.19 0.60 1.34
(0.029) (0.034) (0.005)
Return on Equity (ROE) 45 0.246 0.100 -0.146 0.48 0.56 0.75
(0.071) (0.086) (0.015)
Efficiency
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) 5 0.849 1.121 0.272 1.75 * 0.80 1.34
(0.908) (1.006) (0.098)
Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) 6 0.278 0.939 0.662 1.36 0.83 1.63
(0.726) (0.915) (0.189)
Capital Investment
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA) 30 0.580 0.222 -0.358 -1.82 * 0.37 -1.46
(0.149) (0.136) (-0.013)
Capital Expenditures to Total Assets (CETA) 30 0.079 0.058 -0.020 -1.18 0.43 -0.73
(0.052) (0.054) (0.002)
Table III: Summary of Unadjusted Results for the Sample of All Privatized Firms
This table presents the unadjusted empirical results for the full sample of privatized firms. For each empirical proxy it provides the number of usable 
observations, the mean and median values of the proxy for the three-year periods mean prior and subsequent to privatization, the mean and median change in 
the proxy’s three-year mean value after versus before privatization. It also provides the  Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistics) as the test for 
significance for the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values changed as predicted and a test of 
significance for this proportion.
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Median
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
Proportion Change
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Output
Real Sales (SAL) 43 0.951 1.281 0.330 4.31 *** 0.86 4.73 ***
(0.93) (1.192) (0.263)
Employment
Full-Time Employees (EMPL) 6 1.098 1.041 -0.058 -0.73 0.67 0.82
(1.073) (0.965) (-0.108)
Leverage
Debt to Assets (LEV) 45 0.449 0.252 -0.197 -0.25 0.49 -0.15
(0.233) (0.253) (0.02)
Long-Term Debt to Equity (LEV2) 43 1.492 0.433 -1.059 -0.37 0.49 -0.15
(0.36) (0.362) (0.002)
Dividends
Dividend to Sales (DIVSAL) 31 0.033 0.062 -0.197 3.19 *** 0.84 3.77 ***
(0.014) (0.042) (0.02)
Payout Ratio (PAYOUT) 30 0.208 0.575 -1.059 3.65 *** 0.90 4.38 ***
(0.224) (0.531) (0.002)
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Variables N
Mean 
(Median) 
Before
Mean 
(Median) 
After
Mean 
(Median) 
Change
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted (%)
Profitability
Return on Sales (ROS) 41 -0.710 0.009 0.718 0.05 0.54 0.47
(0.01) (0.014) (0.004)
Return on Assets (ROA) 41 0.011 0.003 -0.009 0.38 0.56 0.78
(-0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Return onEquity (ROE) 41 0.178 -0.003 -0.181 -0.03 0.51 0.16
(-0.012) (0.003) (0.015)
Capital Investment
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA) 30 25.138 0.102 -25.037 -0.94 0.47 -0.37
(0.037) (0.021) (-0.017)
Capital Expenditures to Total Assets (CETA) 30 0.015 0.003 -0.012 -0.65 0.53 0.37
(-0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Output
Real Sales (SAL) 41 -0.209 -0.203 0.006 1.06 0.51 0.16
(0.05) (0.088) (0.038)
Table IV: Summary of Market-Adjusted Results for the Sample of Market-Adjusted Firms
This table presents, for the sample of firms for which it was possible to compute market-adjusted accounting performance measures, market-adjusted results. 
Market-adjusted proxies are obtained by subtracting the market empirical accounting proxy from the firm’s accounting proxy in the sample. The market 
proxies are calculated as the median values of each proxy for a sample of similar firms available on the IQ Capital database. The table provides, for selected 
accounting performance measures, the number of available observations, the median values for the three-year period mean before and after privatization,  and 
the change in median values. It also presents the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians and the Binomial test for the proportion of firms whose 
proxy changed as predicted.
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Median
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
Proportion Change
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Leverage
Debt to Assets (LEV) 41 -0.008 -0.021 -0.014 -0.65 0.59 1.09
(-0.058) (-0.022) (0.036)
Long-Term Debt to Equity (LEV2) 41 1.029 -0.066 -1.095 -0.32 0.51 0.16
(-0.159) (-0.08) (0.08)
Dividends
Dividend to Sales (DIVSAL) 32 0.057 0.092 0.036 2.71 *** 0.69 2.12 **
(0.048) (0.074) (0.026)
Payout Ratio (PAYOUT) 31 0.465 0.889 0.424 3.86 *** 0.84 3.77 ***
(0.512) (0.907) (0.395)
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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These results suggest that despite the increase in profitability experienced after 
privatization, this improvement may be explained by macroeconomic factors since the 
market experienced a similar increase in profitability. 
Efficiency 
To measure efficiency, two measures are employed: inflation-adjusted sales per 
employee (SALEFF) and net income per employee (NIEFF). As explained before, both 
measures are transformed into an index in which the ratio observed in the privatization 
year assumes the value 1 and the remaining years are expressed relative to the 
privatization year. Due to the reduced number of observations available, the results 
must be interpreted carefully. 
As in D'Souza and Megginson (1999), Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998), both SALEFF and NIEFF show median and mean increases following 
privatization, although the increase is significant (at 5 percent level) only for SALEFF. 
Nevertheless, as reported in Table III, for both ratios more than 80% of the firms 
experienced an increase in efficiency. These findings are in accordance with Megginson 
et al. (1994)’s predictions, suggesting that privatized companies tend to increase 
productivity. 
The sales per employee increases from an average (median) of 0.85 (0.91), during the 
pre-privatization period, to an average (median) of 1.12 (1.00), in the post-privatization 
period. Net income per employee also increases from a mean (median) 0.28 (0.73) 
before privatization to 0.94 percent (0.92) afterwards.  
Investment 
Investment intensity is computed using two proxies: capital expenditures divided by 
sales (CESA) and capital expenditures divided by total assets (CETA).  
Though both ratios related are found to consistently decrease, only results for CESA are 
significant (at 10 percent level) according to the Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Furthermore, the adjusted results show a decrease that is insignificant for both ratios, 
both for the Wilcoxon and the Proportion Test. These results are similar to D'Souza and 
Megginson (1999) that found an insignificant decrease in investment, but are contrary to  
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Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and Megginson et al. (1994) that found a significant 
increase in these ratios. 
Despite these results, an analysis to the change in capital expenditures (CAPEX) reveals 
that, prior to divestment, the sample firms presented CAPEX levels that were on 
average (median) 105 percent (94 percent) of year 0 levels. After privatization those 
levels were 137 percent (101 percent) of year 0.  Thus, these results show that the 
decrease in CETA is, at least partially, explained by a growth in total assets higher than 
the growth in investment, and not by the decrease of CAPEX. 
Output 
Changes in output are tested by computing the average inflation-adjusted sales (SAL) 
level for the pre- and post-privatization. Afterwards, following the methodology applied 
for the calculation of CESA and CETA, real sales values are transformed into an index 
in which the output from the privatization year (year 0) assumes the value 1. 
As predicted by Megginson et al. (1994), both the Wilcoxon and Proportion Tests show 
that real sales increase after privatization, and the change is significant at the 1 percent 
level under both measures. Similar results were obtained by D'Souza and Megginson 
(1999),  Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and Megginson et al. (1994). As reported in Table 
III, the mean (median) increase in real sales from the average level during the three 
years prior to divestiture to the average level afterward is 33 percentage points (26 
points), and 86 percent of all firms experience increased real sales. Prior to divestment, 
the sample firms have deflated sales levels that are on average (median) 95 percent (93 
percent) of year 0 levels. By the year of privatization, output increases slightly (to an 
index level of 100), before surging to 128 percent (119 percent) of year 0 levels after 
privatization. 
Besides the strong results in the adjusted data, Table IV shows that the market-adjusted 
data reveals an increase in sales that is insignificant according both to the Wilcoxon and 
Proportion Test. Thus, despite the significant increase in sales after privatization, those 
improvements are not stronger than the experienced by the market, which suggest that 
privatization is not the source of such increase.  
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Employment 
Employment changes are examined by computing the average of the total number of 
employees (EMPL) for the three-year periods -3 to -1 and +1 to +3, transforming those 
values into an index in which the privatization year is the base, and then testing whether 
employment falls after divestiture. Due to the reduced number of observations, results 
must be interpreted carefully. 
Empirical literature shows some inconsistency regarding the behaviour of employment 
after privatization. Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and Megginson et al. (1994) show 
significant employment increases while D'Souza and Megginson (1999) show an 
insignificant decrease. The results from the data analyzed in this work do not allow a 
clarification of this issue. Table III shows an insignificant change in employment. 
Nevertheless, both mean and median results reveal a slight decrease in employment 
levels of 6 and 11 percentage points, respectively.  
Leverage 
Leverage is measured by the total debt-to-total assets (LEV) and by the long-term debt-
to-equity (LEV2) ratios.  
As seen in Table III and IV, both unadjusted and market-adjusted data show little 
difference between the level of leverage in pre- and post-privatization years. 
Nevertheless, the Wilcoxon test shows a (insignificant) decrease in leverage. These 
results are rather different from the ones obtained by Boubakri and Cosset (1998), 
Megginson et al. (1994) and D'Souza and Megginson (1999), where a significant 
decrease in leverage is reported. 
These results suggests that, contrary to the argument that companies with state support 
tend to have higher levels of debt due to the availability of state guarantees, 
privatization do not have a significant impact on leverage. 
Dividends 
Dividend policy changes were measured by the dividend-to-sales ratio (DIVSAL) and 
the dividend payments divided by net income (PAYOUT). 
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As predicted by Megginson et al. (1994), both ratios show significant increases for both 
unadjusted and market-adjusted data according to the Wilcoxon and Proportion tests. 
The average (median) unadjusted dividend-to-sales ratio increases from 3.3 percent (1.4 
percent) before privatization to 6.2 percent (4.2 percent) after privatization. Using 
unadjusted and market-adjusted data, 84 percent and 69 percent of the privatized firms, 
respectively, distribute more dividends as a proportion of their sales. The average 
(median) unadjusted payout ratio increases from 2.1 percent (2.2 percent) before 
privatization to 5.8 percent (5.3 percent) after privatization. Using unadjusted and 
market-adjusted data, 90 percent and 84 percent of the privatized firms, respectively, 
distribute more dividends as a proportion of their sales. 
Those results are very similar to the ones reported by Boubakri and Cosset (1998), 
Megginson et al. (1994) and D'Souza and Megginson (1999) , where a significant (at 1 
percent level) increase of dividends was reported. 
2.  Subsample Analysis 
To more closely analyse the effect of privatization, market-adjusted and unadjusted 
results are also discussed for two subsamples.  
First, to determine whether post-privatization performance depends on the change of 
control, the sample was partitioned into control privatizations (in which the government 
sells enough shares to bring its holdings below 50 percent) and revenue privatizations 
(in which the government retains a majority stake). In this regard, Boardman and Vining 
(1989) and Boycko et al. (1996) suggest that, in order to facilitate restructuring, both 
cash flow rights and voting control rights should pass from governments to private 
hands. 
Second, the full sample is partitioned into competitive and non-competitive firms to 
determine whether the effect of privatization varies according to the prevailing market 
structure. According to D'Souza and Megginson (1999), privatization of enterprises in 
competitive industries is likely to yield solid and rapid economic benefits as long as 
there are no economy-wide distortions that hinder competition. Hence, as argued by 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991), competition can greatly improve monitoring possibilities 
and incentives for productive efficiency. However, for the sale of enterprises in non-
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competitive sectors, the steps are more numerous and the process is more complex. 
According to D'Souza and Megginson (1999), competitive firms are defined as those 
that are subject to international product market competition, and non-competitive firms 
as those that are relatively free of product market competition. Thus, as did D'Souza and 
Megginson (1999), firms from the telecommunications, water and electric utilities are 
included in the non-competitive sample and all other firms in the competitive sample.  
Control and Revenue Privatization Analysis 
As shown in Table V and VI, the subsample unadjusted analysis reveals an increase in 
profitability that is more significant for control privatizations (the increase in ROS is 
significant at 5 percent level) than for revenue privatizations (the increase in ROS is 
insignificant). Market-adjusted results reveal the same trend, although none of the value 
is significant. In fact, when adjusted to market index, the ROS ratio from revenue 
privatizations shows an insignificant reduction. These findings corroborate the 
predictions of Boardman and Vining (1989) that firms in which the government brings 
its holdings below 50 percent will experience stronger changes in performance. 
Regarding the investment, Table V reveals that the decrease in CESA is more 
significant for revenue privatizations, where the decrease is significant at 5 percent 
level. However, as shown in Table VI, when data is adjusted for market measures, the 
difference is even more evident. Companies that experienced revenue privatizations 
show an insignificant decrease in CESA, while companies that experienced control 
privatizations show an increase (significant at a 10 percent level) in that measure. Once 
again, these results are in accordance with the predictions of Boardman and Vining 
(1989) and suggest that when the government loses the control (selling 50 percent or 
more of the company), the company puts more emphasis on the level of investment and 
reveals an evolution that is more expansionist than the experienced by the market. 
While the change in leverage is quite similar both for control and revenue 
privatizations, real sales seem to increase more significantly in the second group of 
companies both according to the adjusted and unadjusted results, contradicting the 
predictions of Boardman and Vining (1989) 
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Finally, as shown in Table V, the increase in the payment of dividends is more 
significant for firms experiencing revenue privatizations (the increase in DIVSAL is 
significant at a 1 percent level) than for control privatizations (the increase in DIVSAL 
is significant at a 10 percent level). However, when the data is adjusted by the market 
performance, the opposite occurs.  The increase in DIVSAL is significant at 1 and 5 
percent level of significance for revenue and control privatizations, respectively. This 
suggest that the increase in dividends after privatization is common both to control and 
revenue privatizations, and is more significant in the first group, corroborating the 
predictions of Boardman and Vining (1989) 
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Variables N
Mean 
(Median) 
Before
Mean 
(Median) 
After
Mean 
(Median) 
Change
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted (%)
Profitability
Return on Sales (ROS)
Control Privatization 10 -2.961 0.070 3.031 2.40 ** 0.80 1.90 *
(-0.009) (0.049) (0.058)
Revenue Privatization 35 0.086 0.090 0.003 0.47 0.54 0.51
(0.076) (0.072) (-0.004)
Capital Investment
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA)
Control Privatization 5 148.661 0.118 -148.543 0.13 0.60 0.45
(0.119) (0.046) (-0.073)
Revenue Privatization 25 0.604 0.243 -0.361 -1.98 ** 0.32 -1.80 *
(0.173) (0.138) (-0.034)
This table presents a comparison between the unadjusted performance changes of firms experiencing control privatizations (in which the government sells 
enough shares to bring its holdings below 50 percent) versus revenue privatization (in which the government retains a majority stake). It provides, for 
selected performance measures,the number of available observations, the median values for the three-year period mean before and after privatization, and 
the change in median values. It also provides the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians and the Binomial test for the proportion of firms whose 
proxy changed as predicted.
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Median
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
Proportion Change
Table V: Summary of Unadjusted Results for the Control Privatization versus Revenue Privatization
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Output
Real Sales (SAL)
Control Privatization 8 0.905 1.148 0.243 2.10 ** 0.88 2.12 **
(0.873) (1.174) (0.301)
Revenue Privatization 35 0.962 1.312 0.350 3.78 *** 0.86 4.23 ***
(0.931) (1.194) (0.263)
Leverage
Debt to Assets (LEV)
Control Privatization 10 1.054 0.203 -0.851 -0.15 0.60 0.60
(0.222) (0.181) (-0.04)
Revenue Privatization 35 0.276 0.265 -0.010 -0.07 0.46 -0.51
(0.233) (0.269) (0.037)
Dividends
Dividend to Sales (DIVSAL)
Control Privatization 4 0.021 0.088 0.068 1.83 * 1.00 2.00 **
(0.02) (0.062) (0.041)
Revenue Privatization 27 0.035 0.058 0.023 2.71 *** 0.81 3.27 ***
(0.013) (0.042) (0.029)
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Variables N
Mean 
(Median) 
Before
Mean 
(Median) 
After
Mean 
(Median) 
Change
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted (%)
Profitability
Return on Sales (ROS)
Control Privatization 9 -3.315 0.005 3.320 0.77 0.56 0.33
(-0.002) (0.022) (0.024)
Revenue Privatization 32 0.023 0.010 -0.013 -0.54 0.53 0.35
(0.013) (0.006) (-0.007)
Capital Investment
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA)
Control Privatization 5 0.047 0.097 0.049 1.75 * 0.80 1.34
(0.038) (0.076) (0.038)
Revenue Privatization 24 0.463 0.107 -0.356 -1.51 0.42 -0.82
(0.035) (0.021) (-0.014)
Table VI: Summary of Market-Adjusted Results for the Control Privatization versus Revenue Privatization
This table presents a comparison between the market-adjusted performance changes of firms experiencing control privatizations (in which the government 
sells enough shares to bring its holdings below 50 percent) versus revenue privatization (in which the government retains a majority stake).  Market-
adjusted proxies are obtained by subtracting the market median empirical accounting proxy from the firm’s accounting proxy in the sample. Market 
proxies are calculated as the median values of each proxy for a sample of similar firms available on the IQ Capital database. This table provides, for 
selected performance measures,the number of available observations, the median values for the three-year period mean before and after privatization, and 
the change in median values. It also provides the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians and the Binomial test for the proportion of firms whose 
proxy changed as predicted.
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Median
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
Proportion Change
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Output
Real Sales (SAL)
Control Privatization 9 -1.215 -2.017 -0.802 -0.06 0.56 0.33
(0.041) (0) (-0.041)
Revenue Privatization 32 0.074 0.244 0.170 1.23 0.50 0.00
(0.053) (0.088) (0.035)
Leverage
Debt to Assets (LEV)
Control Privatization 9 -0.072 -0.097 -0.025 -0.06 0.67 0.67
(-0.131) (-0.05) (0.081)
Revenue Privatization 32 0.010 -0.007 -0.018 -0.73 0.56 0.71
(-0.051) (-0.017) (0.034)
Dividends
Dividend to Sales (DIVSAL)
Control Privatization 6 0.035 0.101 0.066 2.20 ** 1.00 2.45 **
(0.037) (0.064) (0.027)
Revenue Privatization 26 0.061 0.093 0.032 1.94 * 0.62 1.18
(0.052) (0.074) (0.022)
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Competitive and Non-Competitive Firms Analysis 
As shown in both Table VII and VIII, although all the changes in ROS remain 
insignificant, both unadjusted and market-adjusted analyses reveal a slight greater 
profitability enhancement in firms operating in competitive industries. This finding is in 
accordance with the prediction of Vickers and Yarrow (1991) that argue that firms 
operating in competitive industries will experience stronger changes in performance. 
Regarding the investment changes, although the unadjusted data shows a decrease in 
leverage that is more significant for firms operating in competitive industries, when data 
is adjusted by the market performance, this difference becomes almost null.  
Table VII also shows an increase in real sales for both competitive and non-competitive 
firms. Nevertheless, Table VIII reveals that when adjusted by market performance, the 
change in real sales becomes insignificant for both competitive and non-competitive 
firms. 
Changes in leverage are not significantly different. Nonetheless, both for unadjusted and 
adjusted results, there is some evidence of a reduction in leverage for non-competitive 
firms and an increase for competitive firms (even though all the changes are 
insignificant). 
Finally, both Table VII and VIII reveal that the increase in the payment of dividends is 
more significant for companies operating in non-competitive industries than for 
companies operating in competitive industries. This result is valid both for the adjusted 
and unadjusted analysis and both for mean and median values, which shows a clear sign 
of rent extraction. 
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Variables N
Mean 
(Median) 
Before
Mean 
(Median) 
After
Mean 
(Median) 
Change
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted (%)
Profitability
Return on Sales (ROS)
Non-Competitive 20 0.105 0.106 0.000 0.56 0.65 1.34
0.086 0.099 0.013
Competitive 25 -1.148 0.074 1.222 1.57 0.56 0.60
0.046 0.050 0.003
Capital Investment
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA)
Non-Competitive 15 0.864 0.336 -0.529 -0.40 0.33 -1.29
0.238 0.257 0.018
Competitive 15 49.696 0.108 -49.587 -1.65 * 0.40 -0.77
0.090 0.046 -0.043
This table presents a comparison between the unadjusted performance changes of non-competitive privatized firms (firms from the telecommunication and 
water and electric utilities) versus competitive privatized firms. It provides, for selected performance measures,the number of available observations, the 
median values for the three-year period mean before and after privatization, and the change in median values. It also provides the Wilcoxon Z Statistic for 
the difference in medians and the Binomial Test for the proportion of firms whose proxy changed as predicted.
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Median
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
Proportion Change
Table VII: Summary of Unadjusted Results for the Non-Competitive versus Competitive Privatized Firms
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Output
Real Sales (SAL)
Non Competitive 20 1.010 1.371 0.361 2.50 ** 0.85 3.13 ***
0.931 1.213 0.282
Competitive 23 0.900 1.215 0.315 3.59 *** 0.87 3.54 ***
0.880 1.192 0.313
Leverage
Debt to Assets (LEV)
Non Competitive 20 0.338 0.344 0.006 0.45 0.40 0.40
0.281 0.316 0.035
Competitive 25 0.537 0.187 -0.350 -0.69 0.56 0.60
0.192 0.173 -0.019
Dividends
Dividend to Sales (DIVSAL)
Non Competitive 15 0.032 0.066 0.034 3.07 *** 0.93 3.36 ***
0.018 0.046 0.028
Competitive 16 0.035 0.058 0.023 1.60 0.75 2.00 **
0.014 0.034 0.020
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Variables N
Mean 
(Median) 
Before
Mean 
(Median) 
After
Mean 
(Median) 
Change
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted (%)
Profitability
Return on Sales (ROS)
Non-Competitive 19 0.032 0.014 -0.019 -0.08 0.58 0.69
(0.01) (0.014) (0.004)
Competitive 22 -1.351 0.008 1.358 0.05 0.50 0.00
(0.001) (0.01) (0.01)
Capital Investment
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA)
Non-Competitive 15 0.735 0.200 -0.535 -0.51 0.33 -1.29
(0.091) (0.037) (-0.054)
Competitive 15 49.542 0.002 -49.540 -0.17 0.60 0.77
(0) (0.005) (0.005)
Table VIII: Summary of Market-Adjusted Results for the Non-Competitive versus Competitive Privatized Firms
This table presents a comparison between the market-adjusted performance changes of non-competitive privatized firms (firms from the 
telecommunication and water and electric utilities) versus competitive privatized firms.  Market-adjusted proxies are obtained by subtracting the market 
median empirical accounting proxy from the firm’s accounting proxy in the sample. Market proxies are calculated as the median values of each proxy for 
a sample of similar firms available on the IQ Capital database.  This table provides, for selected performance measures,the number of available 
observations, the median values for the three-year period mean before and after privatization, and the change in median values. It also provides the 
Wilcoxon Z Statistic for the difference in medians and the Binomial Test for the proportion of firms whose proxy changed as predicted.
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Median
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
Proportion Change
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Output
Real Sales (SAL)
Non Competitive 19 -0.469 -0.542 -0.073 1.05 0.53 0.23
(0.012) (0.167) (0.155)
Competitive 22 0.015 0.029 0.014 0.47 0.50 0.00
(0.053) (0.026) (-0.027)
Leverage
Debt to Assets (LEV)
Non Competitive 19 0.031 0.034 0.003 0.04 0.47 0.47
(-0.044) (0) (0.045)
Competitive 22 -0.041 -0.055 -0.014 -0.80 0.68 1.71 *
(-0.063) (-0.083) (-0.02)
Dividends
Dividend to Sales (DIVSAL)
Non Competitive 15 0.077 0.102 0.025 2.16 ** 0.73 1.81 *
(0.064) (0.087) (0.023)
Competitive 17 0.040 0.068 0.028 1.73 * 0.65 1.21
(0.022) (0.053) (0.031)
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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VI. Multivariate Analysis 
Although the univariate tests analyzed before show some changes in the performance of 
privatized companies, a multivariate regression allows the control of some 
characteristics of the companies and macroeconomic factors that may explain those 
changes.  
As dependent variable the regression includes, alternatively, the variables that proxy for 
the operational performance, from the pre- and post-privatization period both from the 
privatized companies and from the market-index, namely, return on sales, capital 
expenditures-to-sales, real sales, debt-to-assets and dividend-to-sales. As explanatory 
variables the regression includes the natural logarithm of total assets in the three years 
before privatization, to control for the size of the company, and two dummy variables: 
one that distinguishes observations from the pre-privatization period (DPOST = 0) from 
observations from the post-privatization period (DPOST = 1) and another that 
distinguishes privatized companies (DPRIV = 1) from the control companies (DPRIV = 0). 
The interaction of both dummies (DPOST x DPRIV) is the target-variable as a significant t-
test coefficient would mean a significant difference in the performance of privatized 
companies, after the privatization, when compared with both the same (privatized) 
company before the privatization and control companies that were not privatized.  
Table IX summarizes the results obtained in the multivariate regression. The 
explanatory variable “assets” is only significant (at 10 percent level) for the analysis of 
leverage. The coefficient assumes a negative value, suggesting that bigger companies 
tend to have lower levels of leverage. 
The variable “DPOST” is found insignificant for all the performance measures, meaning 
that, considering both privatized and control companies, there are no significant 
differences between the performance in the years before and after privatization. 
The variable “DPRIV” is found significant only for investment and dividends. Both 
coefficients are positive, which suggest that the companies that were privatized tend to 
pay more dividends and to have higher levels of capital expenditures (both during the 
pre- and post-privatization period).  
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Finally, the variable that captures the effect of privatization on firm’s performance, the 
target-variable “DPOST X DPRIV”, is found significant only for the dividend payment. The 
coefficient has a positive value which means that, after privatization, privatized 
companies increase significantly the payment of dividends, even after considering its 
practices of high dividends before privatization. The opposite occurred to investment. 
Although the variable “DPOST X DPRIV” is insignificant, the coefficient has a negative 
value. This suggests that, although privatized companies tend to have higher levels of 
capital expenditures when compared with market practices, privatization has a slightly 
negative impact on investment. 
These results are similar to the ones obtained from the univariate test, strengthening the 
robustness of the results.  
 
 
Return on Sales 
(ROS)
Capital Expenditures 
to Sales (CESA)
Real Sales 
(SAL)
Debt to Assets 
(LEV)
Dividend to Sales 
(DIVSAL)
DPOST X DPRIV   0.689 -0.295 0.003 -0.216 0.034**
0.961 -1.031 0.006 -1.025 2.433
DPOST 0.019 -0.0178 0.365 0.006 -0.005
0.036 -0.096 1.034 0.041 -0.582
DPRIV -0.683 0.379* -0.216 0.193 0.058***
-1.351 1.86 -0.618 1.298 5.877
Assets 0.028 0.068 0.079 -0.057* -0.001
0.277 1.578 1.115 -1.897 -0.323
Constant -0.137 -0.35 0.599 0.679*** -0.02
-0.169 -1.053 1.068 2.842 -1.218
Adjusted R2 -0.006 0.054 0.025 0.036 0.466
N 168 141 167 167 146
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table IX: Summary of Results From Multivariate Regression
This table reports results of regressions regarding profitability, investment, output, leverage, and 
dividends. A set of control variables are used, including the natural logarithm of real assets (Assets), a 
dummy variable  distinguishing the performance before and after privatization (DPOST), another dummy 
variable  distinguishing firms privatized from non-privatized firms (DPRIV) and a variable distinguishing 
the post-privatization performance of privatized firms ( DPOST X DPRIV). T-statistics are given below the 
coefficient estimates.
Explanatory 
Variables
Dependent Variables
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Although the t-test coefficient is insignificant, results for profitability, investment and 
leverage are similar to the ones obtained in the univariate analysis, revealing an increase 
in the return on sales (ROS) and a decrease in investment (CESA) and leverage (LEV) 
after privatization that is superior to the one observed in the market. Nevertheless, the 
result regarding output is the opposite from the one obtained in the univariate analysis, 
since it reveals an increase in real sales that is inferior to the increase experienced by the 
market.  
40 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Although privatization turned into a worldwide phenomenon some decades ago, recent 
crisis related events have led some South-European countries to launch new and 
ambitious privatization programs.  
This study examines the operating performance of privatized firms in South-European 
countries, namely Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. The analyzed sample includes 45 
companies from several industries. In addition to unadjusted accounting performance 
measures, to control for economy-wide factors, market adjusted measures and a 
multivariate analysis are also reported. 
For the full sample, unadjusted data show an increase in profitability, efficiency, output 
and dividends and a decrease in investment. Despite the positive change in employment 
and the negative change in leverage, these changes are insignificant. As occurred in 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998), the market-adjusted analysis reveals less significant 
results. Changes in performance for all measures but dividends (where a significant 
increase is reported) are insignificant. 
The split of the sample in privatizations in competitive and non-competitive markets 
(telecommunications and water and electric utilities) and in control (more than 50% of 
shares were sold) and revenue privatizations yields very similar results although with 
reduced levels of significance. 
The multivariate analysis corroborates the results obtained in the market-adjusted 
univariate analysis and so the results suggest that after the privatization the only 
significant change in the privatized company is the increase in the dividends paid to the 
shareholders. 
To summarize, although the full sample of privatized firms experience significant 
performance improvements after being privatized, these are only apparent. With 
exception for the change in dividends, when compared to the market performance 
evolution, improvements in performance become insignificant suggesting that 
privatization has little impact on firms’ performance, at least in the short term.   
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 Appendix  
Appendix 1: Summary of the Methodology, Sample and Results of the main studies 
focusing on the Financial and Operating Performance of Newly-Privatized Firm 
  
Study Sample description, study period and methodology Summary of empirical ﬁndings and conclusions
Boubakri and 
Cosset 
(1998)
Compare pre versus post-privatization ﬁnancial and operating 
performance ratios for 79 companies privatized through 
public share offering from 21 developing countries, covering 
32 industries over the period 1980–1992. To isolate the effect 
of privatization on performance from other determinants of 
that performance, market-adjusted accounting performance 
measures were also used. In addition to the full  sample 
analysis, similar tests were performed for four subsamples: 
Competitive VS noncompetitive firms, Control vs revenue 
privatization, Total vs partial privatization and Firms in upper-
midle-income vs low-income and lower-midle-income 
countries.
Document statistically signiﬁcant post-privatization increases in output 
(real sales), operating efﬁciency, proﬁtability, capital investment 
spending, dividend payments and employment, as well as signiﬁcant 
decreases in leverage. The market-adjusted results were very similar, 
showing the same direction in all  the analyzed parameters. Firms in 
competitive industries show greater increase in Capital investment 
spending than firms in noncompetitive industries and a decrease in 
employment. Firms from upper-midle-income countries show a greater 
increase in profitability and efficiency, a minor increase in employment. 
Control privatizations show a greater increase in profitability and 
efficiency than revenue privatizations.
Boubakri and 
Cosset 
(1999)
Examine pre- versus post-privatization performance of 16 
African ﬁrms privatized through public share offering during 
the period 1989–1996. Also summarize ﬁndings of the first 
three studies in this table pertaining to privatization in 
developing countries.
Document signiﬁcantly increased capital spending by privatized ﬁrms, 
but ﬁnd only insigniﬁcant improvements in proﬁtability and insignificant 
decreases in efﬁciency, output and leverage.
Boubakri, 
Cosset and 
Guedhami 
(2005)
Examine pre- versus post-privatization performance of 230 
companies privatized through public share offering from 32 
developing countries during the period 1980–1999. A 
multivariate regression analysis is performed in order to 
examine how institutional and firm level factors affect post-
privatization performance.
Document significant increases in profitability, efficiency, output and 
investment.  Macro-economic reforms and environment, and corporate 
governance significantly affect post-privatization performance of 
privatized firms in developing countries.
D’Souza and 
Megginson 
(1999)
Compare pre versus postprivatization ﬁnancial and operating 
performance ratios for 85 companies privatized through 
public share offering from 13 developing and 15 developed 
countries, covering 21 industries over the period 1990–1996. 
In addition to the full  sample analysis, similar tests were 
performed for five subsamples: Competitive VS noncompetitive 
firms, Control vs revenue privatization, firms in industrialized 
vs non-industrialized countries, change in the composition of 
board of directors and change in CEO.
Document statistically signiﬁcant post-privatization increases in 
profitability, operating efficiency, output (real sales) and dividends, as 
well as signiﬁcant decreases in leverage. Employment declines but 
insignificantly. Capital investment spending increases but insigniﬁcantly.  
Firms in noncompetitive industries have significantly greater increases 
in profitability, efficiency, output and dividends, plus significantly 
greater reductions in leverage, than do competitive industry firms.  
Control privatizations yield significant greater increases in efficiency, 
output and dividend payments than do control privatizations. For other 
subsamples, the results were not statistically diferent.
D’Souza, 
Megginson 
and Nash 
(2005)
Examine pre- versus post-privatization performance of 129 
companies privatized through public share offering from 23 
developed countries during the period 1989–1996. A 
multivariate regression analysis is performed in order to 
examine how institutional and firm level factors affect post-
privatization performance.
Document significant increases in profitability, efficiency, output and 
capital expenditures and a insignificant decrease in employment. 
Ownership, degree of economic freedom and level of capital market 
development significantly affect post-privatization performance of 
privatized firms in developed countries.
Dewenter 
and 
Malatesta 
(2001)
Compare pre- versus post-privatization performance of 63 
large companies divested during 1981–1994 over both short-
term [(+1 to +3) vs (−3 to −1)] and long-term [(+1 to +5) vs (−10 
to −1)] horizons. In addition to the univariate test, a series of 
multiple regressions were performed in order to control for 
changes occurring before privatization and for business cycle. 
Also examine long-run stock return performance of privatized 
ﬁrms and compare the relative performance of a large sample 
(1500 ﬁrm-years) of state and privately owned ﬁrms during 
1975, 1985 and 1995.
Document signiﬁcant increases in proﬁtability and signiﬁcant decreases 
in leverage and labor intensity over both short- and long-term 
comparison horizons. Profitability increases more before privatization 
than afterwards. Firms where government-ownership is high show lower 
profitability and higher leverage. Document signiﬁcantly positive long-
term (1–5 years) abnormal stock returns. Results also strongly indicate 
that private ﬁrms outperform state- owned ﬁrms.
Megginson 
et al. (1994)
Compare pre versus post-privatization ﬁnancial and operating 
performance ratios to the 3-year pre-privatization values for 
61 ﬁrms privatized through public share offering from 18 
countries, covering 32 industries from 1961 to 1989. In 
addition to the full  sample analysis, similar tests were 
performed for three subsamples: Competitive vs 
noncompetitive firms, Total vs partial privatization and Firms 
headquartered in OECD vs Non-OECD Countries.
Document statistically signiﬁcant post-privatization increases in 
proﬁtability, operating efﬁciency, output (real sales), capital investment 
spending, dividend payments and employment (at 10% confidence level), 
as well as signiﬁcant decreases in leverage. The results are generally 
robust when the data is divided in subsamples.
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Appendix 2: Summary of the Main Results From Three Empirical Studies of the 
Financial and Operating Performance of Newly-Privatized Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
(Median) 
value Before 
Privatization
Mean 
(Median) 
value after 
Privatization
Mean 
(Median) 
change Due to 
Privatization
Z-Statistic for 
Difference in 
Performance
% of Firms With 
improved 
Performance
Z-Statistic for 
Significance of 
% change
PROFITABILITY (Net Income÷Sales)
Megginson et al (1994) 0,0552 0,0799 0,0249 3.15*** 69,1 3.06***
(0,0442) (0,0611) (0,014)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) -0,0493 0,1098 0,0605 3.16*** 62,8 2.29**
(0,046) (0,0799) (0,0181)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 0,14 0,17 0,03 3.92*** 71 4.17***
(0,05) (0,08) (0,03)
Weighted average 0,0862 0,1257 0,0396 67,6
EFFICIENCY (Real Sales per Employee)
Megginson et al (1994) 0,956 1,062 0,1064 3.66*** 85,7 6.03***
(0,942) (1,055) (0,1157)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 0,9224 1,1703 0,2479 4.79*** 80,4 4.60***
(0,9056) (1,1265) (0,2414)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 1,02 1,23 0,21 4.87*** 79 5.76***
(0,87) (1,16) (0,29)
Weighted average 0,9733 1,1599 0,1914 81,5
INVESTMENT (Capital Expenditures÷Sales)
Megginson et al (1994) 0,1169 0,1689 0,0521 2.35** 67,4 2.44**
(0,0668) (0,1221) (0,0159)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 0,1052 0,2375 -0,1322 2.28** 62,5 1.74*
(0,0649) (0,1043) (0,0137)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 0,18 0,17 -0,01 0,8 55 0,81
(11) (0,1) (-0.01)
Weighted average 0,1405 0,19 0,0493 60,6
OUTPUT (Real Sales (adjusted by CPI))
Megginson et al (1994) 0,899 1,14 0,241 4.77*** 75,4 4.46***
(0,89) (1,105) (0,19)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 0,9691 1,22 0,253 5.19*** 75,6 4.58***
(0,9165) (1,123) (0,1892)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 0,93 2,7 1,76 7.30*** 88 10.94***
(0,76) (1,86) (1,11)
Weighted average 0,9358 1,7211 0,8321 80,3
EMPLOYMENT (Total Employees)
Megginson et al (1994) 40850 43200 2346 0,96 64,1 1.84*
(19360) (23720) (276)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 10672 10811 139 1,48 57,9 1,19
(3388) (3745) (104)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 22941 22136 -805 -1,62 36 -2.14**
(9876) (9106) (-770)
Weighted average 22936 23222 286 49,5
LEVERAGE (Total Debt ÷ Total Assets)
Megginson et al (1994) 0,6622 0,6379 -0,0243 -2.41** 71,7 3.51***
(0,7039) (0,6618) (-0.0234)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 0,5495 0,4986 -0,0508 -2.48** 63,1 2.11**
(0,5575) (0,4789) (-0.0162)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 0,29 0,23 -0,06 -3.08*** 67 3.05***
(0,26) (0,18) (-0.08)
Weighted average 0,4826 0,4357 -0,0469 67
DIVIDENDS (Cash Dividends ÷ Sales)
Megginson et al (1994) 0,0128 0,03 0,0172 4.63*** 89,7 8.18***
(0,0054) (0,0223) (0,0121)
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) 0,0284 0,0528 0,0244 4.37*** 76,1 4.28***
(0,0089) (0,0305) (0,013)
D’Souza & Megginson (1999) 0,015 0,04 0,025 4.98*** 79 5.24***
0 (0,02) (0,02)
Weighted average 0,0202 0,0655 0,0228 80,4
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Variables and Studies
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Appendix 3: Summary of Sample Details 
 
Year
Company Country Industry
Percentage 
Sold
Transaction Value 
(us$million)
Method of Sale
1993 RODOVIARIA DA BEIRA INTERIOR Portugal Transportation Industry NA 2.9 PS
1993 RODOVIARIA DO TEJO Portugal Transportation Industry 91.14 10.3 PS
1995 EMPRESA NACIONAL DE CELULOSAS Spain Manufacturing 49 112.5 PO
1995 FÁBRICA DE TABACO MICAELENSE Portugal Agricul ture Industry 80 1.6 PS
1995 INDRA SISTEMAS SA Spain Manufacturing 24.9 24.3 PS
1995 PORTUGAL TELECOM Portugal Telecommunications 27.3 1,611.4 PO
1995 TELEFÓNICA DE ESPANA SA Spain Telecommunications 12 1,103.7 PO
1996 DALMINE SPA Ita ly Manufacturing 84.08 191.1 PS
1996 GAS NATURAL SDG SA Spain Uti l i ties 3.81 284.7 PO
1997 ACERÁLIA CORPORATION Spain Manufacturing 100 1,952.6 PS
1997 AEROPORTI DI ROMA Ita ly Transportation Industry 45 327.2 PO
1997 ALDEASA SA Spain Transportation Industry 95 230.0 PO
1997 BRISA AUTOESTRADAS DE PORTUGAL Portugal Transportation Industry 35 521.0 PO
1997 ELETRICIDADE DE PORTUGAL Portugal Uti l i ties 30 2,033.4 PO
1997 TELECOM ITÁLIA SPA Ita ly Telecommunications 44.7 10,916.7 PO
1998 HELLENIC PETROLEUM Greece Petroleum Industry 23 272.7 PO
1998 SAIPEM SPA Ita ly Petroleum Industry 18.75 552.4 PO
1999 ACEA SPA Ita ly Uti l i ties 49 844.1 PO
1999 ACSM SPA Ita ly Uti l i ties 25 19.1 PO
1999 AMADEUS TRAVEL DISTRIBUTION SA Spain Services  Industry 25 890.0 PO
1999 ATHENS WATER EYDAP SA Greece Uti l i ties 25 210.9 PO
1999 AUSTRADE SPA ATLANTIA Ita ly Transportation Industry 57 3,797.0 PO
1999 HELLENIC DUTY FREE SHOPS Greece Trade Industry 25 173.2 PS
1999 ENEL Ita ly Uti l i ties 32.42 17,402.2 PO
1999 IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA Spain Transportation Industry 30 1,115.5 PS
1999 RED ELETRICA DE ESPANA SA Spain Uti l i ties 31.5 387.4 PO
2000 AEROPORTO DI FIRENZE Ita ly Transportation Industry 35.5 23.4 PO
2000 CENTRALE DEL LATTE DI TORINO Ita ly Agricul ture Industry 34.5 19.9 PO
2000 FINMECCANICA SPA Ita ly Manufacturing 50.55 5,252.5 PO
2001 ACEGAS Ita ly Uti l i ties 41.85 140.3 PO
2001 LOTTOMATICA SPA Ita ly Services  Industry 38.8 197.8 PO
2001 PUBLIC POWER CORPORATION SA Greece Uti l i ties 15.1 391.7 PO
2002 FIERA MILANO Ita ly Services  Industry 27 97.6 PO
2003 HERA Ita ly Uti l i ties 38.68 429.3 PO
2003 PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY Greece Transportation Industry 25.5 61.5 PO
2004 SAVE AEROPORTO DI VENEZIA Ita ly Transportation Industry 10 37.1 PS
2004 TERNA Ita ly Uti l i ties 50 2,054.0 PO
2005 EMPRESA DE ELETRICIDADE DOS AÇORES Portugal Uti l i ties 34 42.1 PS
2006 ANSALDO STS Ita ly Manufacturing 52.17 489.9 PO
2006 ASCOPIAVE Ita ly Uti l i ties 40 220.7 PO
2007 ENIA Ita ly Uti l i ties 38.14 501.3 PO
2007 REDE ENERGÉTICA NACIONAL Portugal Uti l i ties 22.27 480.5 PO
2007 SOCIETA AEROPORTO TOSCANO SPA Ita ly Transportation Industry 21.05 35.5 PO
2008 EDP RENOVÁVEIS Portugal Uti l i ties 25 2,793.1 PO
2010 ENELGREEN POWER SPA Ita ly Uti l i ties 29.3 3,428.8 PO
